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Overview
On September 28, 2018, the Wikimedia/Yale Law School Initiative on Intermediaries and
Information (WIII) hosted an intensive, day-long workshop entitled “Intermediaries and Private
Speech Regulation: A Transatlantic Dialogue.” The Yale Information Society Project (ISP) and
the Stanford Center for Internet and Society (CIS) co-hosted this event, with support from the
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School. This intimate, invitation-only academic
workshop took place at Yale Law School.
For this workshop, WIII and CIS convened leading experts from the United States and the
European Union for a series of non-public, guided discussions. Participants discussed the
complicated issue of private speech regulation and the connections between platform liability
laws and fundamental rights, including free expression.
This report presents a synthesized collection of ideas and questions raised by one or more of the
experts during the event, providing an overview of theoretical ideas, practical experiences, and
directions for further research on rapidly evolving questions of intermediary liability from a
uniquely transatlantic perspective. Nothing in this report reflects the individual opinions of
participants or their affiliated institutions.
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Themes2
Governments around the world are increasingly turning to private internet platforms as de facto
regulators of internet users’ speech. In the United States, newly enacted legislation has expanded
internet intermediaries’ liability for users’ communications for the first time in two decades. In
the European Union, the Commission has proposed making social media companies proactively
monitor and remove user communications relating to terrorism. Pressure to combat violent
extremism has already led to troubling errors – including platforms removing political speech,
videos posted by human rights organizations, and users’ discussions of Islamic religious topics.
One key theme for this workshop was whether constitutional and human rights frameworks place
any limits on laws that will foreseeably lead private platforms to silence lawful speech. It may be
possible for states to effectively bypass limitations on their own authority by deploying private
companies without appropriate safeguards. This indirect regulation of speech would create a host
of problems for individual rights. In the United States, few courts have had to confront these
issues in the internet age. Older cases, though, have held that poorly formulated liability rules for
“analog intermediaries,” such as bookstores, could violate the First Amendment.3
Courts and thinkers outside the United States have brought increasing attention to these
questions in recent years. The Supreme Courts of India and Argentina both rejected intermediary
liability rules that would incentivize cautious platforms to silence large swathes of lawful
speech.4 The European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union have
both identified users’ expression and privacy rights as limiting factors for platform liability
rules.5 The prevailing political winds in Europe, however, appear to favor ever increasing
platform responsibility for eliminating unlawful content.
This event brought together a transatlantic group of scholars of constitutional and human rights
law to discuss connections between platform liability laws and fundamental rights, including free
expression. This discussion was particularly timely in light of of developments ranging from the
proposed E.U. Terrorist Content Regulation to Facebook’s announcement of an external, multistakeholder ‘Supreme Court’ for content takedown decisions,6 as well as likely litigation
challenging the constitutionality of FOSTA – the first U.S. law in twenty years to substantially
expand platforms’ legal responsibility for user speech and developments in Europe around
“illegal content online.”7
2

This section of the report borrows significantly from framing materials co-authored by Daphne Keller, with
contributions from Martin Husovec and Joris van Hoboken.
3
See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
4
See, e.g., Singhal v. India, A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 1523; Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], 29/10/2014, “Rodriguez María Belen c/Google y Otro s/ daños y perjuicios” (Arg.).
5
See Daphne Keller, New Intermediary Liability Cases from the European Court of Human Rights: What Will They
Mean in the Real World?, CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y (April 11, 2016),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/04/new-intermediary-liability-cases-european-court -human-rights-whatwill-they-mean-real (last accessed Jan. 17, 2019).
6
See Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-court-speech.html.
7
See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act, H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2018).
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Free Expression Protections and Intermediary Liability
United States and Europe: Learning From Each Other
American lawyers and legal scholars have much to learn from Europe concerning intermediary
liability and speech regulation. First, while the United States has some case law concerning
intermediaries and speech,8 there is a much larger body of European case law concerning these
issues. Participants suggested that U.S. lawyers can gain valuable knowledge, including practical
litigation strategies, from European cases. Second, internationally, the United States is an outlier
in the field of intermediary regulation. Few jurisdictions are even attempting to adapt or apply
the intermediary regulation models of America’s CDA 230 or First Amendment speech
protections, generally.9 Third, E.U. internet policy is only growing in influence and is shaping
the development of global internet policy, as evidenced by the widespread application of the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). For these reasons and more, U.S. lawyers and legal
scholars can and should learn from European perspectives and experiences on intermediary
regulation, particularly concerning free expression.
Because many of the early and large tech platforms came from the United States, many scholars
believe that early internet culture reflected primarily American values, including the particularly
American conception of free speech as a paramount value and a general willingness to allow for
companies to innovate in a free market system with limited regulation. In the European Union
and internationally, human rights models often strive more to balance competing rights, such as
rights to privacy, with rights to free expression. There has also been a history of negative
sentiment against U.S. tech companies for their dominant market power, growing political and
social influence, and frequent refusals to comply with local laws and norms. Some of the major
American tech companies have successfully moved much of their tax flow out of the European
Union, which may be one reason why it has ramped up regulation of intermediaries and tech
companies in recent years.
The European Union has been growing in influence on intermediary and online speech
regulation matters. For example, the Hate Speech Code of Conduct10 and the Audio Visual
Media Services Directive11 are influential laws imposing duties and obligations on

8

See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Center for Democracy &
Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d606 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
9
Though the United States has arguably succeeded in exporting some U.S. internet regulations through trade
agreements, particularly provisions amounting to compliance with DMCA standards.
10
See Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, European Commission, May 31, 2016,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_on_countering_illegal_hate_speech_online_en.pdf
11
See European Parliament legislative resolution of 2 October 2018 on the proposal for a directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services
in view of changing market realities (COM(2016)0287 – C8-0193/2016 – 2016/0151(COD)).
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intermediaries. The European Commission has also been quite active on issues concerning
copyright, extremist speech, hate speech, and political manipulation in online content.
Intermediary regulation in Europe differs from intermediary regulation in the United States,
partially due to different understandings of fundamental rights such as free expression and
privacy rights. Broadly speaking, in the United States, the unique “free speech maximalist”
culture places great value on free speech and free expression. In the European Union, cultural
values focus more on dignitary human rights as a whole, balancing free expression and
information rights against other human rights.
Differences in value systems have influenced how the internet has developed. However,
participants as this workshop emphasized that it is important to remember that the United States
and Europe have more in common than not, at least concerning general human rights values and
democratic principles. Focusing too much on the differences can lead to unproductive division of
resources and intellectual efforts.

Past and Present Themes and Questions
Participants evaluated the ways in which the intermediary and speech regulation environment has
drastically changed in just the past few decades. Since the first developments in intermediary
liability law, a number of key changes have occurred that merit attention.
The world of intermediary and speech regulation has expanded. Online speech regulation is no
longer solely a U.S. and E.U. matter, but a truly global regulatory landscape. Furthermore, the
question today is not simply how to conceptualize and regulate internet intermediaries, but also
how to conceptualize and regulate the growing data economy. Internet intermediary debates have
transitioned from a focus on content takedowns to now emphasizing topics such as Big Data,
machine learning, artificial intelligence, and tools for regulating and enforcing data protection.
In the early days of the internet, many believed that intermediaries served an important function
in supporting a free environment for public discourse. While many still believe this today, there
is also growing concern over negative effects that some intermediaries may have on public
discourse. For example, one negative effect of the rise of intermediaries could be the increased
reach of online political disinformation campaigns on social media networks.
If intermediaries continue to exist as relatively open platforms, they may have to practice more
gatekeeping functions, possibly including ex ante speech restrictions. This could include, for
example, a social media platform blocking certain content from posting to the public view.
Increasing the gatekeeping responsibilities of intermediaries may be positive, in that
intermediaries could better support a healthy speech environment. On the other hand, this
strengthening of intermediaries’ gatekeeping functions could also lead to greater censorship and
restrictions on free speech online.
Furthermore, if more mediation of online speech is deemed necessary or beneficial for a healthy
speech environment, there is still the question of who should be responsible for determining the
standards of online speech. Governments can set these standards through laws and regulation.
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Courts can adjust these standards through legal interpretation. Companies themselves can also
set standards through platform-specific rules or industry self-regulation. The role of civil society
is also important in creating new standards for online speech. The ultimate goal for any new
online speech regulation should be to best protect the ability for intermediaries to provide space
for free expression online, while still protecting against destructive or harmful speech.
One topic of debate among workshop participants was whether the decentralized model of online
speech is still relevant or practicable in today’s internet environment – and whether it should be
protected in an age of increasing consolidation. The early internet provided space for many small
intermediary providers, but today, a number of large companies dominate the online space. As
one participant put it, the “edge of the internet” may be lost already. The market dominance of
the large tech platforms has affected the online public sphere and will likely continue to do so as
platforms grow in size and influence. The centralization of power in a small group of internet
companies may be a threat to the decentralized discourse model of online speech.
New solutions may be needed to protect the potential for decentralized discourse on the internet,
at risk in today’s more centralized internet economy. Some participants suggested that antitrust
regulation is a solution, while others argued that this will not solve the core problem and may
have additional negative consequences. Others raised the prospect of a blockchain-enabled
decentralized web. A few participants also questioned whether the entire conversation around
“the distributed web” has changed, and pointed out that the conversation may now be a moot
point. The distributed web may no longer even be an actualizable ideal.

Changing Political Economy
A larger systemic question is how the political economy has changed since the early days of
internet intermediaries. Many scholars used to believe that intermediaries would allow for free
flow of information, regardless of government regulations. However, it is now apparent that
intermediary companies must comply with government regulations and often with government
requests as well. Effectively, individuals may be losing one check on government regulation of
speech through the loss of an unregulated tech industry.
One way states can target regulatory models is to create different regulations for different
companies, based on size of company, number of users, market power, or other similar metrics.
Large technology companies like the “Big 4” or “GAFA” (Google, Amazon, Facebook, and
Apple) have the power to make specific handshake agreements with governments through a
diplomacy model of negotiation. These companies can negotiate for favorable exceptions to
intermediary liability regulations that may be difficult for other companies to follow. Small
companies are unable to negotiate with states on this scale. This makes it difficult for small
companies to compete. Perhaps the law can address this disparity and level the playing field by
making stratified regulations that target companies based on size or financial status.
Classically, governments set regulations, and companies leave jurisdictions if they dislike the
regulations. This is a “capital flow political economy.” However, today, companies often act
akin to nation-states. As discussed in Frank Pasquale’s work, intermediaries and large tech
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companies are now more like market makers and sovereigns, not market participants.12 The
relationship between companies and governments is now more like diplomacy, not capital flow.
The model is the relationship between Denmark and Germany, not North Carolina and a
furniture manufacturer. Companies and governments engage in negotiation and accommodation.
Some participants argued that this is not a new dynamic; when economic power concentrates,
there will always be “a dance between government and industry.”
Some participants suggested looking to the GDPR as a model, as it uses a principle-based
approach that effectively places greater burdens on larger companies without specifically making
distinctions based on size of company. Europe’s proposed Copyright Directive Article 13 also, in
some drafts, creates greater responsibilities for “platforms that host a large amount of content.”13

Government vs. Private Industry
In recent years, there has been a growing trend of governments leveraging the Terms of Service
of internet intermediaries to request that intermediaries take down online content, in lieu of
governments regulating the online content or speech directly. Effectively, governments have
used and are using corporate terms of service and corporate content takedown mechanisms and
processes as a form of indirect speech regulation. Leveraging corporate takedown processes is
often faster and easier for governments than going through legal procedures for blocking or
removing speech. However, this indirect speech regulation is also much less transparent, and
there is little or no accountability or redress for citizens whose speech have been silenced. When
states use intermediaries as proxies for speech regulation, this has an impact on rights to free
speech and free expression.
In the realm of online speech regulation, it appears that there are two main regulators of speech –
companies (through corporate takedown processes) and governments (through direct speech
regulation and through leveraging of corporate takedown procedures and other indirect speech
regulation). Democratic governments are accountable to their citizens, and corporations are
accountable to shareholders and consumers. However, industry is also dependent on the state for
regulatory approval, taxes, and so on.
It is simple to default to viewing the speech regulation problem as a dichotomy between
government control and industry control. Individuals would then have to decide whether they
trust their governments more than they trust tech companies. Ideally, the law should protect
against abuses from each. However, there may also be alternative or additional models that
include either hybrid state-industry regulatory regimes or models that give greater weight to civil
society and to individuals. Some participants argued that this is one reason supporting the need
for a vibrant civil society that is not beholden to either the government or the industry. While
individuals often can pursue a right of action against private companies, states should also
protect individuals’ rights as well. One participant noted that state responsibility to protect
individuals’ rights could extend to protecting individuals’ rights against intermediary companies.
12

See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon, LAW & POLITICAL
ECONOMY BLOG (December 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/12/06/from-territorial-to-functional-sovereignty-thecase-of-amazon/ (last visited January 17, 2019).
13
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 2016/0280(COD).
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Black Letter Law and Facts on the Ground
Different legal and regulatory doctrines can apply when discussing the regulation of
intermediaries and online speech. By analyzing failures and noting successes, academics and
advocates can create better models for future regulations of online speech.

Lessons from Media and Telecom Regulation
Many believe that online speech regulation can be modeled after or at least take inspiration from
media and telecommunications regulation. But, with the rise and ubiquity of internet
intermediaries, some have argued that there may no longer be many material differences between
intermediaries like Facebook and telecommunications providers like Comcast. However, many
participants believed there still to be a difference between internet intermediaries and
telecommunications companies. Fundamentally, broadband telecommunications are still
essentials, but internet intermediaries have not reached that level of essentiality yet.14 This could
be because these are simply different markets, but also because there is still a lower barrier of
entry for market competitors seeking to participate in the internet space versus the
telecommunications sector. Thus, while future internet regulations can look to telecom
regulations for inspiration, there may not be enough support for entirely regulating these sectors
in the same way.
Some participants suggested using a common carrier model for intermediaries who host or
provide access to content. Under such a model, the government could mandate that a platform
carry content. Consumers could have a right to have their content carried or hosted by an
intermediary service and could potentially have a right to consumer protection claims on this
matter. However, the common carrier model does not currently apply to user-facing content
platforms like Facebook or YouTube and it is unlikely that this model will be transferred whole
cloth to intermediary liability law.15 Furthermore, the terms of service of many intermediaries
include mandatory arbitration clauses that could bar some types of consumer protection claims.

The E.U. Approach: Human Rights and Consumer Law
Some participants claimed that, in the European Union, human rights and consumer law are often
more intermingled than they are in the United States. Using this approach could allow for
regulation of both private companies and non-profits and educational organizations, without
necessitating the creation of multiple regulations differentiated by type of intermediary. As one

14

See Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach, 24 BOSTON U. J. SCI. AND TECH.
L. 193 (2018).
15
See Daphne Keller, Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over Online Speech, Aegis Series Paper
No. 1902, Jan. 29, 2019, available at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/who-do-you-sue-state-and-platform-hybrid-power-over-online-speech (last accessed
Mar. 8, 2019).
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workshop participant noted, “The European approach could be a better approach than simply
creating a consumer regulation but putting Github and Wikipedia in a footnote.”
Aleksandra Kuczerawy’s work was widely discussed.16 Participants especially honed in on the
idea that, through the E-Commerce Directive, the European Union is indirectly incentivizing
intermediaries to interfere with private speech. There is no explicit mass carrier obligation in the
Directive, but there is also no due process for individuals. Thus, there is again the problem
discussed in other sessions of indirect speech regulation causing a deficit of due process rights
for individuals against the state.

The U.S. Approach: The First Amendment and Property Rights
The property interest runs deep in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. Generally speaking,
property owners have the right to not have First Amendment speech regulations interfere with
their private property rights. If lawmakers seek to apply this to the intermediary context, the key
problem then is defining what counts as property or ownership over content or speech online.
There is a line of U.S. cases known as the “shopping mall cases” or “company town cases”17
concerning the conflict between First Amendment rights and private property rights. In these
cases, the Supreme Court considered whether individuals had the right to exercise First
Amendment free speech rights while situated in or on the outskirts or private properties that
were, to various degrees, open to the public. These cases are relevant to understanding
intermediary liability protections. For example, one can easily draw comparisons between a
private corporation’s online intermediary platform and a private corporation’s physical shopping
mall. Both the intermediary platform and the shopping mall can serve as spaces or venues for
speech or expression.
Some cases on First Amendment constraints on government can also be analogized or applied to
the notice and takedown process for internet intermediaries. These include Smith v California18
or Bantam Books v. Sullivan,19 in which the Court held that bookstores are not liable for selling
books with obscene content.

Due Process Concerns
When governments indirectly regulate private speech by incentivizing, advising, or forcing
private companies to take down content, individuals lose due process rights. Users often claim
they lack due process when dealing with content platforms. For example, sometimes users argue
that they have little recourse when platforms remove their content. However, these
intermediaries are mostly private companies, so consumers do not have legal due process rights
16

Aleksandra, Kuczerawy, Safeguards for Freedom of Expression in the Era of Online Gatekeeping, Auteurs &
Media (forthcoming, 2019).
17
See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board,
424 U.S. 507 (1976); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
18
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
19
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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as they would against the state.20 This changes when states pursue indirect private speech
regulation, because then individuals should have those rights.
Participants debated whether a “must carry” obligation might be incompatible with due process
or might make due process irrelevant. (A “must carry” obligation may make takedowns
impossible, thus eliminating the need for a recourse to wrongful takedowns.) The two concepts
may exist on opposite sides of a spectrum (between strong government enforcement of speech
regulation online and complete libertarian freedom for platforms). Alternatively, some
participants argued that a must carry obligation was integral to providing for due process. As
one said, “What’s left of due process without ‘must carry?’ Just transparency reports?”

Distinguishing Intermediaries and Harms
One common complaint among the participants was that existing regulations are overly broad.
Policymakers should avoid creating overly broad regulations and instead tailor regulations
narrowly to best address consumer harms. One way to do this might be to craft regulations that
distinguish between types of intermediaries or perhaps between types of harms.
Participants debated the best way to distinguish between different types of intermediaries, for the
purpose of properly tailoring regulations to address harms. One option is differentiating by size.
There are a few reasons this could be useful. Larger companies may have more resources and
more political power, making them uniquely able to comply with more stringent rules. There
may also be greater need to regulate companies as they grow more powerful. Intermediaries with
greater numbers of users may deserve more regulation (or more stringent regulation) for similar
reasons, as well as the simple fact that more consumers will be affected or protected by
regulations aimed at large companies or companies with large user bases. However,
differentiating intermediaries by size is difficult. It is unclear where to draw the line.
Additionally, a smaller company or one with fewer users might still have deep impact on users
and ability to harm or protect users.
Another option for tailoring regulations is to craft regulations tailored toward protecting or
managing different types of speech. For example, there could be regulations specifically aimed
toward regulating defamation, child protection issues, and so on. Many jurisdictions already have
laws like this. In the United States, broadly speaking, there are some established laws for types
of harms, including intellectual property infringement and online defamation. These regulations
do not affect First Amendment rights. This is one model for looking at future speech regulations.

20

Some participants suggested that states should incentivize platforms to create procedures for due process
concerning user speech; states can do this by offering legal immunity for platforms that provide such rights for uses.
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Moving EU-US Dialogues Forward
In this session, participants discussed strategies to reconcile differences between America and
Europe, with the goal of making better regulations moving forward. Of great debate was the
question of who should make decisions for regulating speech: governments or “the market.”
Some participants noted that “the real fear is when they act together.”

International Cooperation
It is possible to create international standards for speech regulation. Collaboration between
countries on some speech issues can be helpful. For example, states often collaborate on
investigations for violent extremism and child protection related content. However, others argued
that there was a lack of transparency in many of these multi-stakeholder processes. Additionally,
if different jurisdictions develop different regulations, states may have incentive to simply turn
over certain cases to other countries to achieve the same objectives while avoiding a state action
problem.
While one participant offered ICANN as a model for international cooperation, others noted that
the organization lacked transparency, with “entire domains disappearing all the time.” Though
ICANN may be an imperfect organization, it does provide an example of internet governance on
a global scale.

Prior Restraint
Of much discussion was the phenomenon of states using intermediaries to regulate private
speech, effectively a form of prior restraint. This can be in the form of governments directly
asking intermediaries to take down certain pieces of content. Another method often used by
states is when states refer to a company’s own terms of service and recommend (either directly,
or through a third party) that pieces of content be taken down, not for violation of law, but for
violation of terms of service. Some of the third parties often used in these scenarios include
relatively neutral NGOs. Often, these include Internet Research Units (IRUs).
Most agreed that government use of terms of service for content takedowns was a negative form
of prior restraint of speech. This form of speech regulation without judicial oversight has
negative consequences for free speech and free expression rights, both in the United States and
European Union.
Another permutation of this form of prior restraint occurs when states give notice to companies
that content may be illegal, but this notice does not include any formal determination of legality
or any recommendation for the company. Technically, the company then can still make its own
determination and does not have to take anything down. However, if the content does turn out to
be illegal, and the company did not take it down, the state can say that the company had notice.
Thus, effectively, the state is still regulating private speech through the intermediary companies.
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Practical Strategies
Participants discussed practical strategies to push against the growing trend of governments
using intermediary takedowns as a form of private speech regulation. Participants generally
agreed on three main immediate strategies: (1) calling for greater government transparency,
through the FOIA process or through NGO audits; (2) working with companies to gather
information, for use in academic and policy research; and (3) advocating for individuals and
groups who have been disproportionately harmed. Additionally, other forms of advocacy were
also suggested, including amicus briefs, policy papers, and impact litigation.
The first problem to solve is how to obtain evidence concerning platforms’ content removal
efforts and the relative role of state and private actors. Information would be needed regarding
content takedowns (number, source, scale, type, reason, third party involvement), handshake
agreements between states and companies, and impact on users (for example, whether speech
was chilled). Some participants suggested using FOIA to find out what information is being
taken down at government request. However, others demurred, noting that the FOIA process was
often slow and inefficient and it would require knowing exactly which agencies were requesting
which content removals from which companies. Also, others noted that much of the information
would likely not be made publicly available, especially given existing statutory exceptions
(particularly those related to extremism). Ultimately, most agreed that it was still one helpful
avenue of approach.
Participants also suggested working with affected companies, both for information gathering and
to advocate for better policies and processes. Companies could provide as much information as
they are legally allowed on takedown requests from governments or from known third parties
used in these processes. A neutral third party, potentially an academic center or NGO, could then
collect and publish the data from multiple companies. This would allow for more informed
research. With the actual numbers, advocates would have stronger cases for impact litigation and
for policy proposals. Some positive examples of transparency projects include the Lumen
database and the U.K. audit of the Internet Watch Foundation. One particularly important object
of additional transparency and scrutiny would be the terrorism hash database.
For impact litigation, some participants suggested that the ideal plaintiffs would be smaller
intermediaries, which are impacted by these processes but, unlike larger ones, do not have the
ability to negotiate their own arrangements with states. Participants noted that the United States
was probably not the best first choice for impact litigation, possibly simply because the United
States has a longer history of intermediary liability and speech law. This longer history of laws
and greater number of cases on these issues may make future litigation more complicated. Some
suggested Germany, due to beneficial case law on fundamental rights. The Dutch Constitution
also has an absolute ban on prior restraint on speech, which could make the Netherlands a strong
candidate for impact litigation.
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Future Models for Private Speech Regulation
Information Fiduciaries
Participants discussed the “information fiduciaries” model of intermediary and online speech
regulations. This conceptual model was developed by Jack Balkin21 and refined with
collaboration from Jonathan Zittrain and others.22 Essentially, the model places fiduciary-like
duties on intermediary platforms – duties of care, confidentiality, and loyalty to users. This is due
to the relationship platforms now have with users. Users trust platforms to handle great amounts
of private data; therefore, platforms are already acting in a quasi-fiduciary capacity.
There was some debate as to whether the information fiduciary model would impose any
obligations on platforms for content moderation. While some participants believed that content
moderation obligations should follow from fiduciary responsibility, others disagreed. They
believed that platforms only have an obligation to not engage in “data manipulation,” which
Balkin has defined as the use of data to benefit platforms while simultaneously exploiting and
harming users. Balkin has noted that content moderation is only relevant insofar as content
moderation policies involve deliberate manipulation of end users and/or promote end user
addiction. However, others argued that that definition was too limited and that fiduciary duties
should be construed more broadly to include content moderation.
Some disagreed with the information fiduciary model, arguing that companies already have
duties of care toward consumers, under existing bodies of law. Others noted that duties of care
and loyalty to users may sometimes conflict. For example, a platform attempting to satisfy a duty
of care might have a responsibility to give users “good” or “safe” content only. But the same
platform, attempting to satisfy its duty of loyalty, might instead choose to simply give the user
content that the user wants or expects to see. Another question concerns how companies might
balance duties to consumers with human rights; fiduciary responsibilities may imply that
platforms owe more to their users than to universal human rights.
Legally, some argued that fiduciary duties could create groundwork for governments to regulate
more because this could bring online speech into the realm of contract law. One participant
offered a tongue-in-cheek response: “How do we contract around the First Amendment?”

New Sources of Remedy for Harms
There will always be room for new models for regulating any sector. As one participant noted,
“the law tends to want to provide a remedy for harm.” In the past, governments could regulate
content producers for content-related harms. However, today, these content makers no longer are
the ones with money or power; they cannot as readily be called upon to remedy harms. Instead,
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intermediaries have the financial and political power. Thus, it is likely that motivated plaintiffs –
and hence the law – will adapt and find a new source for remedy.

Evaluating New Models
Participants disagreed on whether the GDPR was a good model for future speech regulation.
However, most agreed that the GDPR was a strong model, at least in terms of successful
procedural creation of a new regulation with international reach. Advocates can learn from the
process of GDPR’s creation in calling for and crafting new standards.
Some noted that future regulations should embrace functional distinctions between types of
intermediaries or types of harms – essentially, that regulations were overbroad. Others remarked
that regulations were instead not broad enough, that they ought to focus more on big picture
issues, not on “odd little bits of bad content.”
There are a number of regulations in the European Union (and in some other jurisdictions) that
require companies to take down problematic content such as hate speech or extremist content
very quickly. There was general agreement that regulations calling for very fast content
takedown timelines would likely fail in the long term, as it is difficult for most companies to
comply with such regulations. However, governments and policymakers often face political
pressure to solve problems related to concerns like intellectual property infringement and
extremism. This is likely what sparks many of the overly simplistic regulations that call for
companies to take down content as fast as they can. These regulations may be short-sighted.

Systemic Solutions
Some participants argued that regulations should focus on systemic or architectural changes that
platforms could implement, not pieces of content.
One concept currently of discussion in Europe is imposing a new duty of care for platforms –
essentially, making platforms face legal consequences for having inadequate overall systems and
processes, not for the inevitable individual failures where bad content stays up. This concept of
duty of care could align with the information fiduciaries framework. Regulations focused on
these overall duties would likely require or incentivize systemic or architectural solutions.
Regulating on the systemic level could be easier and more effective than attempting to regulate
content, as content regulation runs into many issues with speech and expression rights. For
example, there could be new regulations specifically mandating impact assessments for
algorithms in content moderation. This would be a discrete, specific regulation that would target
a known harm with relatively practical steps to ameliorate.
On a practical level, some participants asked how architectural solutions could be
operationalized. One example of an architectural solution could be creating a hate speech
detecting algorithm that would then trigger a pop-up asking the user, “Are you sure you want to
say this?” It remains to be seen how platforms might be encouraged or forced to implement
architectural solutions. Governments could create incentives to persuade platforms to enact these
13

high-level changes. Public consumer pressure may also incentivize companies to implement
these solutions.
Many believed in the importance of existing procedural frameworks, including transparency
reporting and risk management procedures for platforms. Additional proposed solutions
included: a system of random audition, where one of every hundred content takedown decisions
gets reviewed by a court or other outside body; new impact assessments for types of content or
for types of moderation, such as algorithmic moderation; enforcing transparency in terms of
service; and creating algorithms “that work in the public interest” to check algorithms used in
content moderation.
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Conclusion
American and European lawyers and legal scholars have much to learn from each other
concerning legal and policy issues related to intermediary liability and online speech regulation.
While the development of the early internet and many of today’s large tech platforms may reflect
primarily American values (particularly regarding free speech and limited regulation innovation),
today’s internet ecosystem is also shaped by the growing influence of the European Union.
While the United States tends toward a free speech maximalist culture, Europe tends to focus on
dignitary human rights, balancing free speech and expression rights against other human rights.
However, participants as this workshop emphasized that the United States and Europe have more
in common than not, at least concerning general human rights values and democratic principles.
Focusing too much on the differences can lead to unproductive division of resources and
intellectual efforts.
Since the first developments in intermediary liability law, a number of key changes have
occurred that merit attention. Online speech regulation is no longer solely a U.S. and E.U.
matter, but a truly global regulatory landscape. Furthermore, the question today is not simply
how to conceptualize and regulate internet intermediaries, but also how to conceptualize and
regulate the growing data economy. Further research should be done to expand the scope of these
discussions to other regions of the world as well.
Today, there is growing concern over negative effects that some intermediaries may have on
public discourse. If intermediaries continue to exist as relatively open platforms, they may have
to practice more gatekeeping functions. However, this could lead to problems due to lack of due
process or transparency. Large tech companies often act akin to nation-states, with the largest
intermediary companies having as much negotiation power as nation-states. The increasingly
disparate power of a few large tech platforms may also lead to a loss of decentralized discourse
and increased difficulties for new competitors to enter the market. Perhaps the law can address
this disparity and level the playing field by making stratified regulations that target companies
based on size or financial status.
In the realm of online speech regulation, it appears that there are two main regulators of speech –
companies (through corporate takedown processes) and governments (through direct speech
regulation and through leveraging of corporate takedown procedures and other indirect speech
regulation). Ideally, the law should protect against abuses from each. However, there may also be
alternative or additional models that include either hybrid state-industry regulatory regimes or
models that give greater weight to civil society and to individuals.
Policymakers should avoid creating overly broad regulations and instead tailor regulations
narrowly to best address consumer harms. One way to do this might be to craft regulations that
distinguish between types of intermediaries or between types of harms. Another option for
tailoring regulations is to craft regulations tailored toward protecting or managing different types
of speech. Future regulatory models for protecting free expression online can look to: U.S. legal
concepts from media and telecommunications regulations, including the “must carry” obligation
and consumer protection law; U.S. First Amendment and property law doctrine; European
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human rights law regarding freedom of expression; and precedent from both the United States
and Europe regarding due process. Other new models that can be useful in shaping future
regulation include the information fiduciaries model and parts of the GDPR. Another option
could be incentivizing systemic, architectural solutions on the part of companies.
One problem for free speech rights is the phenomenon of states using intermediaries to regulate
private speech, effectively a form of prior restraint. Effectively, governments have used and are
using corporate terms of service and corporate content takedown mechanisms and processes as a
form of indirect speech regulation. This indirect speech regulation is also much less transparent,
and there is no accountability or redress for citizens whose speech has been silenced. When
states use intermediaries as proxies for speech regulation, this has a negative impact on rights to
free speech and free expression. Practical strategies to fight against this problem include: (1)
calling for greater government transparency, through the FOIA process or through NGO audits;
(2) working with companies to gather information, for use in academic and policy research; and
(3) advocating for individuals and groups who have been disproportionately harmed.
Additionally, other forms of advocacy were also suggested, including amicus briefs, policy
papers, and impact litigation.
Europe and the United States must work together to protect online free expression and access. By
analyzing failures of existing regulations and noting successes, academics and advocates can
create better models for future regulations of online speech. Regulatory solutions for online
speech issues must address the entire internet ecosystem. The ultimate goal for any new online
speech regulation should be to best protect the ability for intermediaries to provide space for free
expression online, while still protecting against destructive or harmful speech. Future
international standards must also include perspectives from other nations and regions, as the
internet is global. Collaboration between countries on online speech issues can be helpful and
should be encouraged.
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Workshop Agenda
This detailed agenda includes framing discussion prompts and related questions. The discussion
prompts and questions served as reference or inspiration for conversations.

Session 1 : Free Expression Protections and Intermediary Liability
Discussion Leads: Martin Husovec, Daphne Keller
At the heart of the debate about intermediary liability and speech protections are a number of
legal and constitutional questions. These include: the scope of fundamental rights protections;
the question of state action and the delineation of public and private power; and the role that law
has to play, alongside other forms of governance, in establishing the relationships among states,
internet intermediaries and speakers.
● What elements and requirements in intermediary liability law follow from constitutional
and human rights law, and how does the former inform the latter?
● What limits, if any, do constitutional and human rights frameworks place on laws that
lead private platforms to silence lawful speech (i.e., privatized enforcement)?
● Can states effectively bypass limitations on their own authority by delegating regulatory
responsibility to private companies without appropriate safeguards?
● What distinctions can be made between different types of speech intermediaries and their
different responsibilities? On what basis should those distinctions be drawn?
● What are the value and relevance of distinctions in existing safe harbors, like CDA230,
DMCA, and ECD? What are the value and relevance of the distinctions predating those
laws? For example, one distinction is that between carrier, distributor, editor.
● What are the implications of the cross-border nature of online speech platforms? What
limitations follow from jurisdiction?

Session 2: Black Letter Law and Facts on the Ground
Discussion Leads: Daphne Keller, Joris van Hoboken
Building on the first session’s discussion of constitutional and fundamental rights, this discussion
will examine how those rights are protected -- or not -- by black letter legal doctrines and current
platform and government practices. Discussion will cover, among other things, legal theories to
challenge or defend state and private exercises of power over online expression.
● How do specific doctrinal aspects of intermediary liability law -- including takedown
procedures and concepts of “knowledge” or “neutrality” -- affect internet users’ free
expression rights?
● Are there persuasive rights-based arguments against laws requiring platforms to use
technical filters to automatically block content?
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● Can platforms be First-Amendment-protected speakers in cases defending their right to
remove user-generated content, but also assert immunity as intermediaries when they fail
to remove content? How does the European version of this dispute play out?
● Does the law put any limits on the rules that platforms can incorporate in their
Community Guidelines or Terms of Service? Should it?
● Do doctrines from other areas of law, including telecommunications, media regulation,
and antitrust, help in answering these questions?

Session 3: Moving EU-US Dialogues Forward
Discussion Leads: Martin Husovec, Tiffany Li
In this session, we will look at what Europe and America can learn from each other, based on the
discussions that we had in previous sessions. We will highlight and discuss commonalities and
differences in E.U. and U.S. approaches to constitutional protection of speech. In particular, we
will look at how lines of argumentation, legal concepts, and practical implementation of laws
compare in the transatlantic context.
● Do legal regimes in Europe and the United States conceptualize delegation of
enforcement in the same way? Does the constitutional scrutiny differ depending on
whether the state acts only by means of incentives, rising eyebrows, direct informal
pressure, else? Does algorithmic enforcement require a distinct approach?
● How can we effectively separate delegated enforcement and private ordering of content
in the constitutional analysis? Where and how should we draw a line?
● Do situations when the general monitoring obligation would violate free speech standards
differ in Europe and the United States?
● Is the European concept of positive obligations present in U.S. law? If not, what
supplements its role? Do different policy areas such as hate speech, terrorist content, and
copyright infringement require different types of analysis?

Session 4: Future Models for Private Speech Regulation
Discussion Leads: Tiffany Li, Joris van Hoboken
This session will focus on future or alternative models of intermediary liability and private
speech regulation, including extension or expansion of current models of speech regulation.
Regulatory models for discussion will include but not be limited to: common carrier models,
antitrust regulation, information fiduciaries, multi-tier regulations for intermediaries by type,
hybrid public-private models, and more. If time allows, we will also share practical policy
strategies to advocate for new or improved regulatory models.
● What is missing in current legal and policy frameworks for intermediary liability and
private speech regulation? What has changed about society or technology that demands a
change in regulatory models?
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● What problems should future intermediary and speech regulation frameworks seek to
solve? What values should they uphold or protect? How are these problems and values
different from the problems and values that guided the development of the early
intermediary liability regimes?
● How should new frameworks take into account existing problems with intermediary
liability regulations? Existing problems may include the problem of scale, jurisdictional
conflicts, and the threat of Splinternet.
● What are current trends (positive and negative) in intermediary liability and private
speech regulation? What is working and what isn’t working? Are different jurisdictions
moving toward similar shifts in intermediary regulation?
● What are practical strategies to influence the development of future regulatory models for
intermediary regulations in America and Europe?
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Workshop Organizers
Wikimedia/Yale Law School Initiative on Intermediaries and Information
The Wikimedia/Yale Law School Initiative on Intermediaries and Information is a research
initiative that aims to generate awareness and research on intermediary liability and other issues
relevant to the global open internet. WIII grew out of an ongoing academic affiliation and
collaboration between Yale Law School’s Information Society Project and the Wikimedia
Foundation and is made possible, in part, by funding from the Wikimedia Foundation, in support
of Wikimedia’s mission to build a world in which everyone can freely share in knowledge.
Stanford Center for Internet and Society
The Center for Internet and Society (CIS) is a public interest technology law and policy program
at Stanford Law School and a part of Law, Science and Technology Program at Stanford Law
School. CIS brings together scholars, academics, legislators, students, programmers, security
researchers, and scientists to study the interaction of new technologies and the law and to
examine how the synergy between the two can either promote or harm public goods like free
speech, innovation, privacy, public commons, diversity, and scientific inquiry. CIS strives to
improve both technology and law, encouraging decision makers to design both as a means to
further democratic values. CIS provides law students and the general public with educational
resources and analyses of policy issues arising at the intersection of law, technology and the
public interest. CIS also sponsors a range of public events including a speaker series,
conferences, and workshops. CIS was founded by Lawrence Lessig in 2000.
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